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Biogenic approaches investigate cognition from the standpoint of evolutionary function, 
asking what cognition does for a living system and then looking for common principles and 
exhibitions of cognitive strategies in a vast array of living systems – non-neural to neural. 
One worry which arises for the biogenic approach is that it is overly permissive in terms of 
what it construes as cognition. In this paper I critically engage with a recent instance of this 
way of criticising biogenic approaches in order to clarify their theoretical commitments and 
prospects. In his critique of the biogenic approach, Fred Adams (2018) uses the presence of 
intentional states with conceptual content as a criterion to demarcate cognition-driven 
behaviour from mere sensory response. In this paper I agree with Adams that intentionality is 
the mark of the cognitive, but simultaneously reject his overly restrictive conception of 
intentionality. I argue that understanding intentionality simpliciter as the mark of the mental 
is compatible with endorsing the biogenic approach. I argue that because cognitive science is 
not exclusively interested in behaviour driven by intentional states with the kind of content 
Adams demands, the biogenic approach’s status as an approach to cognition is not called into 
question. I then go on to propose a novel view of intentionality whereby it is seen to exist 
along a continuum which increases in the degree of representational complexity: how far into 
the future representational content can be directed and drive anticipatory behaviour.  
Understanding intentionality as existing along a continuum allows biogenic approaches and 
anthropogenic approaches to investigate the same overarching capacity of cognition as 
expressed in its different forms positioned along the continuum of intentionality. Even if all 
organisms engage in some behaviour that is driven by weak intentional dynamics, this does 
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not suggest that every behaviour of all organisms is so driven. As such, the worry that the 




1. Introduction  
 
 
One kind of starting point for investigating cognition begins by asking questions pitched at 
the kind of ‘high-level’ capacities paradigmatic of human cognition (e.g., beliefs, desires, 
concept formation, language, reasoning, consciousness, etc.). Some examples of such 
questions are: Is rationality a necessary property of intentional systems?  (Dennett, 1983)? Do 
all thoughts have a language-like, propositional structure (Fodor, 1975)? What kind of neural 
processing does consciousness involve (Carruthers, 2019)? This starting point then attempts 
to account for possible instances of such ‘high level’ capacities within an explanatory 
framework tailored specifically to them. Philosophers taking this starting point tend to 
conceptualize cognition in terms of different mental states which are taken to be individuated 
- like linguistic performances – by their truth conditions (Cf. Fodor, 1987). Although often 
empirically-informed, biological considerations regarding cognition when used are non-
essential and generally serve as a means to theorize about features typical of human 
cognition. From this anthropogenic starting point, human cognition is often viewed as the 
standard against which all other forms of behaviour are recognized as a proper topic for 
cognitive scientific inquiry. 
Another kind of starting point, the biogenic approach (Lyon, 2006) sees biology as essential 
to understanding cognition. This biologically-grounded approach (or strictly speaking, family 
of approaches) starts from an evolutionary continuity assumption that ‘higher’ cognition in 
humans is different in degree but not in kind from cognition in simpler organisms (Darwin, 
1871). It holds that the most fruitful route to understanding cognition in its various forms is to 
begin with considerations regarding adaptivity, fitness, and principles of biological 
organization. As such the biogenic approach (BA) starts with biological facts - as typically 
exemplified by the adaptive behaviour of basal organisms - and attempts to work its way up 
to human cognition. Crucially, by widening the scope of model organisms under 
consideration to include organisms such as bacteria and plants as cognizers, proponents of 
BA suggest that it is well placed to identify possible organizational principles and conserved 
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mechanisms underlying a full range of cognitive capacities, from simple to complex (see 
Lengler et al., 2000; Ben Jacob et al., 2006; van Duijn et al., 2006; Baluška & Mancuso 2009; 
Bechtel, 2014; Baluška & Levin, 2016; Levin, 2018; Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019; Barrett, 
2019; Calvo et al., 2020; Bechtel & Bich, 2021). 
 
One worry which arises for BA is that it is overly permissive in terms of what it construes as 
bona fide cognition. The behaviour of bacteria and plants is something that philosophers have 
been prone to consider as an inflexible, reflexive response to sensory stimuli (Dennett, 1984; 
Sterelny, 2001; Godfrey-Smith, 2002; Schlicht, 2018). If such behaviour under BA qualifies 
as an expression of cognition, then it seems––one might worry––that the very notion of 
cognition is rendered too unconstrained to be explanatorily useful. This kind of worry is 
voiced by Fred Adams (2018), who in a recent critique of BA responds by providing a strict 
demarcation criterion that allows for drawing a sharp line between the cognitive and the non-
cognitive. This classification methodology, which is informed by traditional philosophy of 
cognitive science, uses the presence of intentional states with conceptual-level content as a 
manner of picking out behaviour that is underwritten by cognitive processing. Armed with 
this conception of the mark of the cognitive, Adams mounts an argument against BA: 
because the various cases of behaviour that biogenic theorists have classified as cognitive are 
not underwritten by intentional states with conceptual-level content, such cases of behaviour 
fail to be expressions of cognition; they are more accurately classified as hardwired responses 
to sensory information processing.  What I call Adams’ ‘argument from intentional content’ 
goes on to conclude that this conflation is harmful to the endeavours of cognitive science and 
that BA should be abandoned as an approach to cognition.  
 
The general worry that BA is overly permissive (or even incoherent) relies on an implicit 
appeal to some mark of the cognitive. Adams is thus useful to engage with because he makes 
a rare attempt to explicitly spell out what this mark of the cognitive is in a way that purports 
to be informed by the nature and methodology of cognitive science. Identifying the 
infelicities of Adams’ critique gives us a better view of the explanatory tools that BA might 
have at its disposal, and the manner in which anthropogenic and biogenic approaches relate to 
each other. Is there, however, another classification methodology available that is compatible 
with the range of cognitive behaviours recognized by biogenic theorists, yet which 
nonetheless offers a manner of distinguishing the cognitive from the non-cognitive? In what 
follows, I will argue that this question may be answered affirmatively. For from the fact that 
 
 4 
many cognitive scientists have been interested in some specific mode of functional 
organization such as intentional states with conceptual-level content, “one cannot infer the 
difference between exhibiting that mode of organization and not exhibiting it must in some 
way play a decisive role in marking off the cognitive from the noncognitive” (Wheeler, 2010, 
pp. 256-267). The difference between the presence of that mode of functional organization 
and its absence may simply fall within the domain of the cognitive and hence within the 
domain of cognitive science. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, I propose to grant Adams’ contention that intentionality is the 
mark of the cognitive. However, unlike Adams, the position that will be taken here is that it is 
intentionality simpliciter rather than intentionality with conceptual-level content that is the 
mark of the cognitive. This view of intentionality, I shall argue, is compatible with the 
manner in which biogenic theorists approach cognition. I do so by proposing and arguing for 
the intentionality continuum thesis, a thesis that is both biogenic and yet informed by looking 
at the range of projects cognitive scientists actually spend their time doing. On one end of the 
taxonomy I present, there is weak intentionality of the internal dynamics that drive 
anticipatory sensorimotor and biochemical behaviour. Meaningful content at the level of 
weak intentionality is, we shall see, phenotype-relative. It is directed at yet-to-be encountered 
environmental/sensory states that are to be pursued (or avoided) given the conditions which 
an agent must remain in in order to preserve its organization over the long run. On the other 
end there is strong intentionality which involves mental states with conceptual content that is 
deployable offline. Intentionality is a necessary feature of cognition, but where a particular 
behaviour/state falls upon the continuum of intentionality is of no relevance to that 
behaviour’s being (or not being) an expression of cognition. I shall argue Adams’ 
anthropogenic-based hallmark of the cognitive looks arbitrary once we appreciate that the 
intentionality that is of interest to cognitive scientists is not exhausted by intentional states 
with truth evaluable content. Given that contemporary cognitive science does indeed 
investigate and recognize putative cognitive phenomena and mechanisms that fall all along 
the continuum of intentionality, the manner in which Adams delineates cognitive from non-
cognitive processes is undermined by the range of interests and aims of researchers in the 
very discipline he attempts to safeguard. Understanding intentionality as existing along a 
continuum allows biogenic approaches and anthropogenic approaches to investigate the same 
overarching capacity of cognition as expressed in its different forms positioned along the 
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continuum. Even if all organisms engage in some behaviour that is driven by weak 
intentionality, this does not suggest that every behaviour of all organisms is so driven. As 
such, the general worry that BA is overly permissive can be avoided. The continuum thesis is 
promising not only as grounds for a reply to cognitive chauvinists who use an overly 
sophisticated notion of cognition, but because it illustrates that both biogenic and 
anthropogenic approaches are valid starting points for investigating a common notion of 
cognition.  
 
This paper will proceed as follows: Section 2, provides an overview of BA. In Section 3, I 
present Adams’ argument from intentional content against BA. In Section 4, after quickly 
surveying some of the practices and projects of contemporary cognitive science, I argue that 
because cognitive science is not exclusively interested in behaviour driven by intentional 
states with truth evaluable representational content, BA’s status as an approach to cognition 
is not called into question in the way that Adams suggests. I then propose a novel view of 
intentionality whereby it is seen to exist along a continuum that ranges in the degree of 
representational complexity. In this view complexity is a measure of how far into the future 
representational content can be directed and drive anticipatory behaviour. This section 
concludes by returning to the worry that BA is overly permissive. I argue that even if 
cognition turns out to be a ubiquitous feature of living organisms, it is simply not the case 
that everything that an organism does would qualify as cognition or that the cognition that 
various organisms engage in could all be accounted for in the same way. As such, the worry 




2. The Biogenic approach  
 
Biogenic approaches constitute a loose family of approaches that are unified by themes and 
motivations rather than strict commitments.1 In her seminal paper ‘The biogenic approach to 
cognition’ Pamela Lyon (2006) identifies a particular investigatory strategy which she claims 
has been central to two distinct subfamilies of biogenic cognitive explanation: self-organizing 
complex systems theories and autopoietic theory. The first of these kinds of explanation, 
 
1 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify this important point.  
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examples of which may be seen in the work of Goodson (2003), Rosen (1985/2012), Piaget 
(1970), Popper (1965/1972), Vertosick (2002), Christensen (2004), Bickhard (2009), and 
Deacon (2012), among others, places emphasis upon the relation between cognition and the 
second law of thermodynamics. More precisely, it sees cognition as a process that 
underwrites an organism’s ability to remain in thermodynamically improbable non-
equilibrium steady states despite the tendency for all systems to move towards 
thermodynamic equilibrium. Homeostasis, the preservation of steady-states (e.g., 
physiological states such as oxygenation, core temperature, and metabolic energy levels), is 
an ongoing result of a dissipative system’s ability to modulate its parameters (i.e., internal 
processes and external behaviour) so as to avoid persistence-compromising situations (e.g., 
starvation or predation).2 Self-organizing complex systems theorists thus see cognition as the 
host of capacities, varying in their complexity, that guide a system’s parameter modulation so 
as to preserve its homeostatic balance and keep it at thermodynamic disequilibrium despite 
environmental perturbance.  
In contrast, rather than understanding cognition in terms of thermodynamic regulation, 
autopoietic theory (Maturana 1970/1980; Maturana & Varela,1980; Thompson, 2007; Di 
Paolo, 2005) understands cognition in terms of a biological system’s ability to continuously 
produce itself and distinguish itself from its milieu. Self-production is the internally driven 
process with which a biological system continuously constructs and realizes its own network 
of processes (Maturana and Varela, 1980).3  Self-distinction, on the other hand, is the process 
of generating and preserving systemic boundaries (e.g., a cell membrane) by which an 
organism partitions itself from its non-systemic environment. Self-production and self-
distinction are construed as necessary and sufficient conditions on life. According to 
autopoietic theory, cognition is entailed by life, expressing a deep continuity between life and 
mind. In other words, “living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a 
process of cognition” (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 13).4 The overlap between self-
organizing complex systems theory and autopoietic theory should be clear: both kinds of 
theory construe cognition in terms of the functional contribution that it makes towards an 
 
2 A dissipative system is a thermodynamically open system that, which in virtue of exchanging matter and 
energy with the environment, remains far from thermodynamic equilibrium. 
3 There are important disagreements between ‘autopoietic theory’ as propounded by Maturana and the enactive 
approaches developed by Varela, Thompson and Di Paolo. See Villalobos & Ward (2015). 
4 Although autopoietic theory is an example of a biogenic explanatory approach, it is not required that a 
biogenic approach be committed to the kind of entailment thesis (i.e., that life entails mind and mind entails life) 




organism’s adapting to its environment so as to remain alive. Self-organizing complex 
systems theory emphasizes capacities to navigate energetically dynamic environments so as 
to self-preserve; autopoietic theory emphasizes the capacities leading to self-production of 
the organismic boundary that defines the autonomous organism in relation to its external 
environment.  
This overlap is illustrative of the core explanatory strategy of BA; BA starts from the notion 
that cognition is a functional capacity that, being driven by various selection pressures, has 
been gradually selected for––perhaps many times––over evolutionary timescales. Thus, BA 
starts with the facts of biology in attempting to understand what cognition does for biological 
systems. This is clear when Lyon writes:  
 
“An investigator adopting a biogenic approach assumes that the principles of 
biological organization and the requirements of survival and reproduction present the 
most productive route to a general understanding of the principles of cognition. 
Cognition, whatever it may be in the future, is naturally a biological process and a 
biological function” (2006, p.12).  
 
 
The explanatory agenda of BA is determined by biological considerations. We saw above 
that BA may be contrasted with the anthropogenic approach (AA) (Lyon, 2006). Generally, 
cognition in AA is conceptualized with no essential reference to biological function.  AA like 
BA is a loose family of approaches, which rather than sharing any particular commitments, 
are unified by common explanatory foci and motivations. The cognitive is often demarcated 
from the non-cognitive by using distinctively human capacities (e.g., believing, thinking, 
planning, decision making, reasoning, etc.) as the non-negotiable standard of cognition. The 
notion of cognition that these kinds of capacities and their putative mechanisms suggest is 
then used comparatively to determine whether or not the behaviour of non-human systems 
should be considered as expressive of cognition. It is in this sense that AA works from the 
human case “downwards” to possible cases of non-human cognition (Lyon, 2006). Because 
of its human-centred demarcation criteria, AA generally assumes that the possession of a 
central nervous system, the use of representational states, and rationality are all central 
features of cognition.  
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To take an example from the philosophy of perception literature to illustrate the different 
approaches. Tyler Burge (2010) in his opus ‘Origins of Objectivity’ considers what makes 
perception distinct from mere sensory registration. Although his empirically-informed 
analytical method is biologically thoroughgoing, his desiderata for what constitutes bona fide 
perception are thoroughly anthropogenic. For instance, one of Burge’s criteria for perception 
is that it must involve the possibility of representational success and failure. In other words, 
perceptual states must be either veridical or non-veridical. Crucially, the veridicality 
conditions that are used to individual perceptual states, according to Burge, are not the same 
as – nor do they answer to – the conditions under which an organism would or would not 
survive; a state’s being veridical is not the same as a state’s functioning in a manner that 
reflects its selection history. Considering the biological function of perception is inessential 
to his analysis. He motivates his use of this veridicality criterion with the fact that perceptual 
psychology has been a successful in accounting for the problem of perception and that the 
veridical/non-veridical distinction has been explanatorily central in accounting for the 
problem.5 Given that perceptual psychology and the problem of perception has been largely 
grounded in human perception, this criterion for perception is an instance in which putative 
features of human cognition are used to carve nature at its joints. As a result of his analysis, 
Burge concludes, speculatively, that bona fide perception can be found as far down the 
phylogenetic tree as arachnids.  
Compare Burge’s approach to perception with that of Paco Calvo et al.’s (2020) approach to 
perception, the latter of which is easily interpretable as an instance of researchers taking a 
biogenic approach. Calvo and colleagues analyse plant perception (and cognition more 
generally) within an ecological context. This context, a real-world environment as opposed to 
a laboratory environment, is one that houses a variety of selection pressures (e.g., predation, 
resource acquisition, etc.) that any organism must behaviourally adapt to in order to bring 
about its continued survival. Cognition is seen as any adaptive behaviour that improves an 
individual’s chances for survival over the course of its lifetime. Against this background, 
Calvo et al. (2020) analyse perception as part of the more encompassing process of cognition 
from within the framework of complex systems theory; perception both feeds into 
learning/memory and assessment systems and receives feedback from behavioural response 
systems. As such, perception and behaviour are understood as a cyclical process, which, pace 
 
5 This is the problem of how the perception of particulars and properties is possible given impoverished and/or 
underdetermining proximal stimuli. 
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Burge, is not in the game of constructing veridical representations but rather of controlling 
adaptive behaviour that allows a system to persist in the face of environmental stressors. The 
notion of veridicality is bypassed altogether.6 Importantly, to investigate how and what a 
particular kind of organism perceives Calvo et al. stress that one must look to the selection 
pressures that such an organism must cope with in its niche. On this account, whether or not 
(and what) plants perceive is not a question that can be addressed by using standards derived 
from a perceptual psychology that has been tailored to human capacities. On the other hand, 
one may start with identifying basic cognitive organizational principles as exhibited by basal 
organisms and plants and attempt to understand more complex forms of cognition in relation 
to them (i.e., in terms of the complexification of cognitive architectures, internal models, and 
functional and structural organization).  
By understanding cognitive capacities in terms of their biological function to guide adaptive 
behaviour from the very start, biogenic theorists are not constrained by human-centred 
demarcation criteria; the proponent of BA may choose to investigate how the same biological 
function may be expressed in humans as well as in non-neural organisms (e.g., bacteria, slime 
moulds, plants etc.) despite the fact that such living systems differ vastly in terms of their 
organismal complexity. This being said, there is an interesting overlap between BA and AA. 
It is exposed by the fact that the distinction between BA and AA “relates to starting 
assumptions about the problem space, not to how ‘biological’ a proposal is” (Lyon, 2006, p. 
16). For example, proponents of BA needn’t reject that some forms of cognition may involve 
the kinds of features which are taken by AA to be central to cognition. For example, Goodson 
(2003), a biogenic theorist through and through, provides an account of cognition that helps 
itself to representational states. His use of representations in explanation is consistent with 
the fact that his investigation of cognition is premised upon the assumption that cognition is a 
biological process essentially, and that this assumption determines how his investigation of 
cognition proceeds. 
 
Similarly, an AA theorist may take biological considerations into account when formulating 
an anthropogenic theory. For example, AA theorists may attempt to construct a general 
biologically informed account of how representational content is fixed by looking to 
candidate representational mechanisms in simple systems (Cf. Dretske, 1981). A theorist can 
 
6 For an argument as to how Burge’s veridicality constraint on perception can be satisfied by plants when 
veridicality is construed as accurate enough for the guidance of adaptive behaviour see (Sims, 2019). 
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do this whilst still holding that propositional attitudes, like beliefs, in humans are the gold 
standard for bona fide cognition. More generally, although AA proponents may investigate 
cognition in simple systems (e.g., nematode brains), such investigation will ultimately be led 
by a conception of what cognition is that premised upon human capacities. For this reason, 
BA’s proponents argue that the biogenic perspective allows for a more complete picture of 
cognition and how various cognitive phenomena are related despite being selected for by 
different evolutionary pressures. Lyon writes: 
 
 
“It is important to stress that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, indeed, 
both are necessary for a complete picture. We must understand what cognition is and 
what it does as a natural phenomenon, but we also have to understand human 
psychological experience” (2006, p. 26). 
 
 
Here, Lyon makes it explicit that the two approaches to investigating cognition are linked in 
the sense that investigating what cognition does for biological systems will ultimately include 
investigating how it does what it does in the human case. That being said, there is a tension 
between AA’s demarcation criterion and BA’s biological starting point. For BA, many 
genuine instances of cognition may take a very different form than that of human cognition. 
It is due to the AA theorist’s more restrictive conception of cognition that she may attempt to 
dismiss the broader set of non-human-like capacities recognized as cognitive by BA theorists 
as something else. As will be seen in the next section, it is just this kind of charge that Fred 




3. The Argument from Intentional Content  
 
Adams (2018), on behalf of AA, has recently raised an objection against BA. Appealing to 
the interests and practices of contemporary cognitive science, he argues that cognitive 
scientists use the term “cognition” to refer to something very different than what BA theorists 
use the term to refer to. Hence, thinks Adams, attending to cognitive scientific practice shows 
that we should prefer AA to BA. In line with a venerable trend in philosophy of cognitive 
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science (Fodor, 1990; Dretske, 1981), Adams’s general anthropogenic classification 
methodology distinguishes cognition from non-cognition by holding that the former is a kind 
of processing that necessarily involves internal representational states with intentionality. 
Intentionality, the property of “aboutness” that mental states have to be directed at the world 
was originally proposed by Brentano (1874/1995) as the mark of the mental. In other words, 
“all and only mental phenomena exhibit intentionality” (Schlicht, 2018, p. 8) (see also Crane, 
2016). These intentional states, Adams contends, take the format of representations with 
conceptual-level content, the meaning of which is determined by states of affairs in the world 
that they are about. Adams writes:  
 
 
“[…] cognition requires specific kinds of representational formats. And these formats 
are built on top of information processes. The symbols that are cognitive are built 
from information exchanged between system and environment. But the format of 
these representations is semantic at a level above that of the information itself” 
(Adams, 2018, p. 24; my emphasis). 
 
 
It is only when intentional states with conceptual-level content operate on sensory 
representations (i.e., sensory information states) that the resulting behaviour can truly be said 
to be cognitively driven.7 Adams’s clarifies this format distinction between meaning-bearing 
representations with conceptual-level content and sensory representations when, referring to 
his own work and that of Dretske (1981,1998) he writes: 
 
“But conceptual representations are different kinds of representations than sensory 
ones. The change from information to meaning (where the content of a concept is its 





7 The mere deployment of representations with intentional content without resulting behaviour (e.g., thinking, 




“I am suggesting that cognition is this kind of information processing which alters the 
representational format to a different level––to the level of meaning and not just 
information” (Adams, 2018. 28).  
 
 
To get an idea of the kind of representational format that he argues underwrites genuine 
cognition, Adams offers an example. If a person senses that the temperature of a room is 
increasing, whether or not she is aware of it, she also senses the increasing mean molecular 
kinetic energy (mmke) of the air surrounding her. However, if she thinks that the room’s 
temperature is increasing, she needn’t think that the mmke of the surrounding air is also 
increasing. This example demonstrates that although thoughts, beliefs, desires, and other 
representations with intentional content may be about the same referent (in this case a target 
event), thinking one kind of thought (distinguished by its meaning) about a referent does not 
entail thinking all corollary thoughts about the same referent.8 Although sensory information 
processing may involve representations, such representations fail to have the right format, on 
Adams’ construal, and thus they never to rise to the level of meaning.9  
 
In contrast to the deployment of intentional states with conceptual-level content, Adams 
claims that what BA calls ‘cognition’ is mere information processing of sensory states which 
results in hardwired, adaptive behaviour. Although cognitive and non-cognitive processes 
both involve information processing and adaptive behaviour, the kind of adaptive behaviour 
that is driven by mere sensory information (in a sensory format) alone does not rise to the 
status of being cognitive behaviour. It is because what biogenic theorists refer to as cognition 
is actually “information-driven behaviour that is adjusted in response to variable 
environmental conditions” (Adams, 2018, p.27), that biogenic plant scientists and biologists 
erroneously categorize the adaptive behaviour of organisms such as plants and bacteria as 
cognition-driven processes. When biogenic theorists claim that plants and bacteria exhibit 
cognitive capacities what they are really doing is changing the subject altogether from 
 
8 This is an instance of Frege’s problem (i.e., referential opacity). 
9 The distinction between what Adams calls sensory representations and representations with intentionality may 
be interpreted as being analogous to Grice’s (1957) distinction between “natural meaning” and “non-natural 
meaning”. Natural meaning is indication-based. For example, smoke indicates fire, but smoke is not about fire 
in the sense that one cannot intelligibly speak about the presence of smoke in the absence of fire as something 
that is ‘false’. Non-natural meaning, on the other hand, rises to the level of semantics. For example, that the 
word “water” means “tasteless, odourless, colourless liquid” makes it the case that the proposition “water is 
black and tastes like tar” is false.  
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cognition to something else. For in such cases “there are no internal states that mean (in the 
sense of having truth values) things outside the system” (Adams, 2018, p.29). Adams 
concludes that because intentionality is a distinctive characteristic of the cognitive and this is 
something which BA by ascribing cognition to plants and bacteria fails to respect, biogenic 
researchers are in the practice of investigating something very different than what cognitive 
science recognizes as cognition.  
 
I will now respond to this argument by providing another classification methodology for 
distinguishing the cognitive from the non-cognitive, one which is compatible with the range 




4.0 Responding to the Argument from Intentional Content 
 
It may be assumed that Adams’s primary reason for locating cognition at the level of 
intentional states with conceptual content is based upon his view of what cognitive science 
recognizes as cognition.10 If biogenic theorists when ascribing cognition to bacteria and 
plants are using “cognition” to mean something other than processing that reaches the level 
of intentional states with conceptual-level content “then no one in current cognitive science 
would be alarmed” (Adams, 2018, p.28). However, if such theorists are not ascribing 
cognitive capacities to plants and bacteria instrumentally and actually “intend the cognitive 
ascriptions to be true, then it is not harmless” (Adams, 2018, p.29).11  
 
I will now argue that proponents of BA can both agree with Adams that intentionality is a 
distinct feature of the cognitive and yet consistently reject his claim that intentionality must 
be concept-based in order for processing to qualify as cognition. More specifically, using a 
 
10 To be clear, Adams is in agreement with Lyon, who when setting out what she identifies as the core 
anthropogenic principles (i.e., the core principles of contemporary cognitive science), claims that intentionality 
is a distinctive feature of cognition according to AA. BA principles as put forth by Lyon (2006) do not include 
intentionality. Interestingly, if the continuum that I propose below is correct then Lyon has overlooked 
intentionality as a necessary feature of cognition that is common to BA and AA.  
11 Although BA theorists are not ascribing cognition instrumentally, one might question whether the plant 
scientists and microbiologists whose research biogenic theorists help themselves to are engaging in instrumental 
talk. For a sustained argument as to why there is no non-question-begging reason to dismiss the use of 
psychological predicates as merely instrumental or metaphorical when biologists apply them to basal organisms 
see Figdor (2017, 2018). 
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classification methodology that is compatible with what cognitive scientists actually do, I 
shall propose a view of intentionality simpliciter that conceives of it as a continuum, ranging 
from weak to strong intentionality. Because cognitive science investigates and recognizes 
cognitive phenomena all along the continuum and not just at the level of strong intentionality 
where Adams restrictively locates cognition, his argument against BA turns out to be ill-
motivated. In locating cognition exclusively at the level of strong intentionality, Adams 
disregards the range of research that cognitive scientists have engaged in over the course of 
the last 40 years. I begin with an initial response that considers some of the current practices 
of cognitive science. This response challenges the motivation underwriting Adams’ 
demarcation criterion. I shall then introduce the intentionality continuum thesis as a primary 
response to Adams’ argument from intentionality and more generally as a ground for 




4.1 The Practices of Current Cognitive Science 
 
Does cognitive science recognize and investigate only those phenomena that are underwritten 
by intentional states in the form of beliefs and desires with concepts as their constituents? 
While there is plenty of cognitive science that is aimed at investigating phenomena at the 
level of Adams’ strong intentionality, it appears that there is plenty that is not. A wide range 
of cognitive scientific research programmes such as action-blindsight research (Kentridge, 
Heywood & Weiskranz, 1999), two visual streams research (Milner and Goodale, 1992), 4E 
cognition (i.e., enactive, embedded, embodied and situated cognition) (Clark, 1997/2008; 
Chemero, 2009; Beer 2000; Thompson, 2007; O’Regan, 1992; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 
Kirsh, 2010), action-oriented cognition ( Jeannerod, 2006; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Engel, 
Maye, Kurthen, & König, 2013; Pezzulo, 2011; Tversky, 2019), and dynamic systems 
accounts (Thelen & Smith, 1994; Beer, 2000; Kelso, 2016; Newell & Liu, 2012)–to name a 
few–investigate and explain psychological processes in ways that do not essentially implicate 
states with conceptual-level contents. This is not to deny that much of cognitive science is 
focused upon phenomena at the level of strong intentionality. What I am arguing however is 
that cognitive science does not exclusively investigate phenomena at the level of strong 
intentionality. The existence of each of these many programmes demonstrates that cognitive 
science recognizes and investigates processes that do not exclusively involve conceptual 
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representations. To take an example, the core of embodied cognition is based upon the claim 
that a complete understanding of cognition requires understanding the various constitutive 
roles that the sensorimotor systems play in not only conceptualization (see Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1980) but also how we respond to environmental changes and solve problems in the 
here and now (Clark, 2008). A classic example of this is the ecological solution to the 
baseball outfielder problem in which by moving so as to keep a flyball’s position steady in 
one’s field of view––staying coupled to it via sensorimotor engagement––one is able to 
adjust one’s movement’s in light of the ball’s perceptible trajectory and eventually catch it 
(McBeath et al., 1995).12 The kind of conceptual-level representation that Adams argues is 
definitive of intentionality is rendered superfluous by this simple solution to the problem of 
how to catch a fly ball.  
 
More generally, the kind of cognitive science which has emerged in the last 40 years has 
recognized a problem space that calls for the use of adaptive strategies that are not limited to 
detached planning, abstract thought, and conceptualization. The agreed problem space of 
cognitive science has been widened to include problems that arise on faster timescales. 
Attempting to address these problems has motivated many researchers to abandon the kind of 
traditional “sandwich” model of cognition that Adams uses (i.e., where cognition is 
conceived of as a process occurring sandwiched between perceiving and acting).13 Many of 
the problems in this wider problem space may be efficiently solved by eliciting frugal and 
fast solutions of environmentally coupled perception and action loops (Clark, 2008). This is 
not to say (radically) that all solutions required within this widened problem space involve 
the coupling of an organism to the environment via action and perception, but rather that 
there are various kinds of cognitive strategies that may be deployed given the nature of the 
problems which organisms are faced with. 
 
One counterargument that Adams might potentially raise at this point is that cognitive science 
is merely a misnomer and hence what many cognitive scientists study actually falls outside of 
the domain of cognition proper. If this is the case, then identifying what cognitive scientists 
actually do is no argument against Adams’ demarcation criterion. This kind of objection can 
be resisted, however, for the following reason: assuming for the sake of argument that 
 
12 For different theoretical perspectives regarding this process see McLeod, Reed & Dienes, (2006) on optical 
acceleration cancelation and see McBeath, Shaffer & Kaiser, (1995) on linear optical trajectory. 
13 Susan Hurley (1998) is responsible for coining the term “sandwich model”. 
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cognitive science studies both cognition and pre and post-cognitive processing, then Adams’ 
motivation for claiming that cognition is restricted to intentional states with conceptual-level 
content cannot be that of honouring the practices of cognitive science; his demarcation 
criterion for cognition returns a much narrower range of capacities than those studied by 
cognitive scientists. If his demarcation criterion is motivated by a subset of cognitive 
scientific practices, then he must supply a way to delineate that subset independently of his 
own criterion. He cannot say, circularly, that his criterion for cognition is picked out by a 
narrow range of capacities that cognitive science studies and that the narrow range of bona 
fide cognitive capacities that cognitive science studies is picked out by his demarcation 
criterion. Hence, even if cognitive science were a misnomer, then the practices of cognitive 
science alone cannot motivate Adam’s demarcation criterion.14 
 
To sum up: Adams’ argument from intentionality would like to conclude that BA is 
untenable and is harmful to cognitive science because it conflates actual cognition with mere 
sensory information processing. However, if one takes into account the range of research 
programmes that have been developing over the last 40 years (i.e., what cognitive scientists 
have actually been investigating and how the field is developing), his claim about what 
“cognition” means to cognitive science is simply not true (anymore). Adams hence fails to 
provide a valid reason to reject BA as a cognitive explanatory framework. 
 
BA however is not off the hook. Even if Adams’ demarcation criterion fails to be motivated 
in the manner that he thinks it is, the onus is nonetheless placed upon the BA theorist to make 
explicit the shared core aspect of cognition which links BA and AA explanations. For without 
such a common core, Adams’ contention that BA and AA are investigating different 
processes remains a real threat to BA. Far from serving its intended purpose, I would like to 
suggest that the argument from intentionality provides a valuable opportunity to demonstrate 
just how BA and AA are linked. Disagreeing with Adams that the mark of the cognitive must 
take the specific form of intentionality with conceptual-level content does not entail rejecting 
the idea that intentionality simpliciter is a distinctive feature of cognition. In the next 
subsection I will develop the intentionality continuum thesis and argue that when taking it 
into account, demarcating the cognitive from non-cognitive by way of an intentionality 
criterion fails to be a consideration against BA. If the intentionality continuum thesis is 
 
14 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection. 
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correct, BA and AA merely lie upon two poles on the continuum, separated by the degree of 




4.2 The Intentionality Continuum Thesis  
 
One the basic BA assumptions is that cognition is a set of evolved traits that has been 
selected for in virtue of its functional contribution towards organismic adaptivity. Cognition 
as such is seen as graded, moving from less to more complex cognitive capacities. If 
intentionality is the mark of the cognitive, and assuming that intentionality also underwrites 
the differences in degrees of cognitive complexity, then one might reason that intentionality 
is also a graded feature. The intentionality continuum thesis provides one plausible way of 
understanding the graded nature of intentionality. If correct, it offers a biologically plausible 
manner of theorizing about the possible evolution of intentionality and the evolution of the 
various cognitive capacities that have arisen in tandem with the complexification of 
representational content.  
 
The intentionality continuum thesis proposes that intentionality varies along an axis of 
representational complexity, moving from less complex to more complex representational 
content and hence from simpler to more sophisticated forms of cognition.15 Future-oriented-
ness will be used in what follows as a general measure of representational complexity; it 
describes how far into the future content allows an organism to behaviourally adapt to yet-to-
be-encountered environments/sensory states. Future-oriented content that operates over the 
timescales of minutes is more representationally complex than content that operates over 
seconds. Moreover, more complex representational content (i.e., strong intentional content) 
that operates over longer/slower timescales comes about as the result of the combined activity 




15 The intentionality continuum thesis assumes that representation is an essential aspect of intentionality; 
“aboutness” or “directedness” is necessarily a matter of representing some target state of affairs. This is 




Understanding representational complexity in terms of content’s future-oriented-ness finds 
support in various programmes including associative learning research (Ginsburg & 
Jablonka, 2019); active inference theories of action planning (Pezzulo et al., 2015; Corcoran 
et al., 2020), and computational models of cognitive boundaries in theoretical biology (Levin, 
2019) to name a few. The idea common to all of these research programmes is that organisms 
embody internal models of their environments and their behavioural consequences upon the 
environment (Cf. Bechtel & Bich, 2021). Evolutionarily, as organisms became able to 
incorporate increasingly temporally distal consequences of both their current behaviour and 
environmental causes into their behavioural regime, their internal models became more 
complex. Model complexity is scored by a model’s temporal depth (Pezzulo et al., 2015; 
Friston et al, 2017; Ginsburg & Jablonka et al, 2019; Levin, 2019; Calvo, et al., 2020). An 
increase in temporal depth requires that an internal model must have more interacting levels 
of control mechanisms. Because faster interactions tend to occur between spatially adjacent 
levels, organisms with shallow models are limited to faster timescale interactions, the kinds 
that are involved in tightly coupled organism-environment causal traffic. As such, the 
preferences of less complex organisms are largely restricted to what is occurring at the 
present moment in their immediate environment (Levin, 2019). Under the assumption that 
models serve anticipatory behaviour (see below), the mechanisms of shallow models that 
anticipate sensory/environmental input needn’t anticipate far into the future, and hence, they 
have little temporal depth. The interaction between distant mechanisms at different levels in a 
deep model (i.e., with increased levels of organization) not only means that there is a delay 
across increasingly distant levels, but also that in order to anticipate the activity at the 
spatially distant sensorium, higher levels must be able to anticipate further into the future. 
Thus, it is the increased hierarchical organization of temporally deep models that allows for 
the increased decoupling of such models from the direct influence of the environment and 
immediate behaviour.16 Since there are plausible reasons to interpret internal models in 
representational terms (see Rosen, 1985/2012; Sims & Pezzulo, 2021), increased 
representational complexity can be understood as increased model complexity (i.e., increased 
temporal depth). It is in the notion of temporal depth that the measure of future-oriented-ness 
is grounded. 
 
16 Strictly speaking, in the general context of biological systems this levelled organization may be more 
accurately understood in terms of heterarchical arrangement as opposed to hierarchical arrangement (see 
Bechtel & Bich, 2021). 
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Although there have been previous philosophical accounts that have attempted to understand 
representational complexity as existing along a continuum (see Millikan, 1989, 2004; 
Sterelny, 2003; Schulz, 2018), the intentionality continuum thesis breaks with these proposals 
in two crucial ways. Firstly, the proposed continuum thesis takes a biogenic approach to 
investigating intentionality; it starts from the biological facts and works its way up to the 
human case. Importantly, the motivation for working up to the human case is not to stress 
differences between human cognition and non-human cognition, as is typical of AA, but 
rather to expose a possible commonality (weak intentionality) underwriting all forms of 
cognition. The notion of meaning and goal-directedness that weak intentionality is grounded 
in will be approached using the conceptual tools of control theory (Wiener, 1961; Conant & 
Ashby, 1970). Accordingly, organisms will be cast as self-organizing dynamic systems, the 
adaptive behaviour of which is finessed by sensory feedback and driven by control 
mechanisms that maintain setpoints (i.e., homeostatic norms) at different nested levels of 
biological organization. These setpoints must be kept within a limited range in order for a 
system to remain alive. A system’s integrated dynamics are thus directed towards the 
maintenance of homeostatic norms and, importantly, what biological representations mean to 
a given system is relative to that system’s homeostatic norms. 
Secondly, the intentionality continuum thesis differs from other continuum approaches in 
taking anticipation to be an essential property of cognitive systems. For example, Millikan 
(2004) in providing an account of the complexification of representations, starts from what 
she calls “pushmi-pullyu” representations. These are primitive representations that have 
undifferentiated indicative and imperative content. According to Millikan, a splash of a 
beaver’s tail may indicate something like “there is currently a predator flying above”. The 
same tail splash may simultaneously be a sign for other beavers to “initiate escape behaviour 
now!”. The distinction between the kind of primitive content (i.e., weak intentional content) 
that the intentionality continuum locates at one pole of the continuum and pushmi-pullyu 
content is this: Whereas pushmi-pullyu representations describe how the world is now, states 
with weak intentional content describe how the world will be (given how the world is now). 
Moreover, whereas pushmi-pullyu representations specify what an organism should do in 
response to how the world is, weak intentional content specifies what an organism should do 
in preparation for how the world will be. If cognition is fundamentally anticipatory, then this 
difference seems to be an important one. For any account of primitive intentionality must be 
 
 20 
able to account for the nature of anticipatory behaviour. This is something that the kind of 
weak intentionality that is central to the intentionality continuum is in the position to do. 
One reason to interpret basic biological representations as describing how the world will be 
may be arrived at by asking the following question: In what circumstances would 
representations be needed by the simplest biological systems? Thus, reasoning from 
biological need to future-oriented representational content. On one understanding of 
representations, they function as stand-ins for absent targets (van Gelder, 1995; Pezzulo, 
2008; Sims & Pezzulo, 2021). Accordingly, accounting for simple reflex-like responses do 
not require representational explanation because the mechanisms with which reflexes are 
produced are purely reactive and sustained by external stimuli; reflex profiles are caused by 
specific aspects of detected stimuli (i.e., stimulus kind, strength, and/or duration) in the 
presence of that stimuli. However, under the assumption that being limited to purely reactive 
compensation – like reflexes – would be detrimental to the ability of an organism to adapt to 
the selective pressures in its environment (Rosen, 1985/2012), it is reasonable to think that an 
organism’s ability to successfully adapt requires a means for it to extrapolate from present 
stimuli to yet-to-be encountered states of affairs and guide its behave accordingly.17 We thus 
arrive at a reason to interpret weak intentional content as playing the role of standing in for 
yet-to-be encountered sensory/ environmental states via the route of acknowledging a basic 
biological need for proactive compensatory behaviour. 
 
The assumption that cognition is fundamentally anticipatory finds support with Lyon (2006), 
who in describing one of the biogenic principles of cognition writes: “cognition is 
intrinsically future-oriented (what happens next?) and thus predictive” (p. 23). The idea that 
cognition is fundamentally anticipatory also follows a long tradition in psychology and 
cognitive science (Bartlett, 1932; Craik, 1943; Piaget, 1970; Neisser, 1976; Drescher, 1991; 
Arbib, 1992; Riegler, 2001; Grush, 2004; Castelfranchi, 2005; Bar, 2007). Despite the fact 
that cognitive science has primarily focused on the anticipatory nature of human cognition, it 
 
17 Imagine, for instance, of the difference between two hypothetical bird populations, Fasts and Slows, that are 
identical other than the following phenotypical difference: Fasts can behave according to acquired colour cues. 
They have learnt that every time Mrs. Miller’s bright red coat is present, shortly thereafter they will receive 
breadcrumbs. As such Fasts have a tendency to swoop down and flock around Mrs. Miller upon her arrival. 
Slows on the other hand, do not have this capacity to learn colour cues and, as such, they merely respond to 
Fasts eating bread by flocking around Fasts. As such, by the end of Mrs. Miller’s daily feeding routine, Slows 
have secured - if anything at all! - the crumbs that Fasts have left behind. Now, imagine that the only food 
source for both Fasts and Slows regularly came from Mrs. Miller. Slows’ reactive behaviour would place them 
at a significant fitness disadvantage relative to Fasts, who due to their ability to use cues to anticipatorily behave 
would most likely outcompete the population of Slows.  
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is important to stress that anticipatory behaviour is not unique to neuronal organisms. For 
instance, Tagkopoulos et al. (2008) have shown that there is anticipatory aerobic respiration 
repression in bacteria E. coli. that occurs prior to oxygen level depletion. Saigusa et al. (2008) 
have provided striking evidence that slime moulds (P. polycephalum) anticipate periodic 
change in dryness conditions. Research by Rodaki et al. (2009) have shown that fungi too 
respond to yet-to-be-encountered stress in an anticipatory manner. Novoplansky et al., (1990) 
have provided evidence that the common purslane (P. oleracea) anticipatorily grows away 
from other plants that will compete with it for light in the future. It is these kinds of 
anticipatory behaviours that are overlooked and left unaccounted for by previous accounts of 
primitive representation and thus warrant the place of the intentionality continuum thesis. 
Since, according to this thesis, all anticipatory behaviour is driven by weak intentional 
content (see below), future-oriented-ness is both fundamental to understanding intentionality 
and how this mark of the cognitive exists along a continuum of increasing complexity.  
 
To be sure, because there are additional measures that are needed for a complete 
characterization of increasing representational complexity (e.g., format, compositionality, 
recursion, etc.) future-oriented-ness will serve us here as one kind of heuristic for an initial 
investigation into intentional strength. I will assume that such additional complexity metrics 
are largely independent dimensions of a multidimensional space. For simplicity of exposition 
and owing to space limitations, any additional measures and how they interact with future-
oriented-ness will not be included in the following treatment of the continuum thesis.  
 





4.2.1 Weak intentionality 
 
 
On one end of the continuum is what I call weak intentionality; I shall define this as the 
aboutness of internal dynamics that is directed at yet-to-be encountered environmental state 
targets and that causally underpins adaptive behaviour. Such dynamics are meaningful insofar 
as they bring about environmental conditions that are relevant to an organism’s long-term 
 
 22 
homeostatic maintenance by proactively guiding behaviour. Weak intentionality is 
phenotype-relative in the sense that not every environmental condition has the same 
homeostatic relevance to every kind of organism (e.g., being an air environment is important 
to a human’s continued homeostasis but not to a fish’s). Much like what autopoietic theorists 
have called “basic intentionality” (Thompson, 2007; Schlicht, 2018), weak intentionality is a 
feature of the entire organism and its behaviour rather than a feature of mental states or 
underlying mechanisms. It is a property of an organism’s integrated internal dynamics that is 
causatively manifested in sensorimotor and biochemical behaviour.  
 
Not just any adaptive behavioural response counts as weak-intentionality-driven. In order to 
qualify as weak-intentionality-driven, behaviour must be directed at having higher-order 
homeostatic influence; an organism behaviourally invests its current short-term homeostatic 
stability (i.e., metabolic resources) for the long-term homeostatic stability brought about as a 
result of that behavioural investment. In some organisms, this will manifest as overt 
behaviour, exerting a direct influence upon its surrounds (e.g., a plant’s spending metabolic 
resources now in directing its growth away from the location that light competing plants are 
likely to eventually occupy (Novoplansky et al., 1999). In other organisms, this higher-order 
influence may take the form of metabolically expensive investments in gene transcription in 
preparation for yet-to-be-encountered stress conditions (see example below). 
 
To be sure, although behaviour that is driven by weak intentionality allows homeostatic 
maintenance, it is not reducible to homeostatic reflex response. The distinction between 
homeostatic control and higher-order homeostatic influence may be cast as the difference 
between a purely reactive form of self-regulation (see Cannon, 1929) and allostasis or 
proactive “stability through change” (Stirling & Eyer, 2012).18 Whereas reflexes involve 
direct responses to stimuli in virtue of sensory deviations from genetically encoded 
homeostatic setpoints (Pezzulo et al., 2015; Stephan et al., 2016), behaviour driven by weak 
intentionality is anticipatory. Its anticipatory nature implies that such behaviour has a degree 
of independence from the influences of the environment; it is freed from being fully 
determined by the current states of the encountered environment. As a result, the same 
environmental stimuli may not always result in the same behaviour. This is significant for 
 
18 Although allostatic theory was originally applied to describe the behaviour of neuronal organism, it has more 
recently been expanded to include the behaviour of non-neuronal organism (Alfieri, 2008; Corcoran et al., 2020; 
Kiverstein & Sims, 2021). 
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two reasons: firstly, it suggests that weak intentionality driven behaviour exhibits more 
flexibility than mere reflex-like response;19 secondly, it opens up a space for a kind of 
primitive agency; rather than being “pushed around” by sensory stimuli, an agent’s behaviour 
is normatively constrained by maintaining certain long-term homeostatic conditions that its 
persistence depends upon.20  
 
In order to exhibit weak intentionality a living system’s inner dynamics requires a minimal 
degree of future-oriented-ness. We may roughly understand future-oriented-ness to operate 
according to the following kind of rule:  
 
Given an environmental state type A that is regularly followed by environmental state 
type B and that this A-B correlation has been learnt (over phylogenetically or 
ontogenetically timescales) by an organism O; anytime O detects an instance of state 
A, its weak intentional content will be directed at an instance of state B as a function 
of O’s homeostasis. This will be the case despite the fact that B is yet-to-be-
encountered.  
 
19 Following Schulz (2018) I would argue that even reflexes exhibit some degree of flexibility. Whether or not a 
reflex response occurs not only depends upon the detection of an appropriate stimulus but also often depends on 
an organism’s current physiological conditions. For example, if an organism is fatigued, it may not respond to a 
stimulus that it tends to respond to stereotypically.  
20 Walsh (2015) in arguing for a continuum of “ecological agency” similarly recognizes a kind of agency that 
even simple systems such as bacteria may be endowed with. Walsh analyses ecological agency in terms of three 
related notions of “goal-directedness”, “affordances”, and “behavioural repertoires”. The idea, roughly, is that 
being a goal-directed system is a requirement for experiencing environmental conditions as opportunities for 
action (i.e., “affordances”) and experiencing conditions as affordances requires having a behavioural repertoire. 
Behavioural repertoires come in degrees; some biological systems having restricted repertoires and others 
having a larger range of behaviours in which they may engage. As such, agency also comes in degrees. For 
example, according to Walsh bacteria qualify as having a low degree of agency as a result of their restricted 
behavioural repertoires. Even though bacteria are ecological agents, Walsh - engaging in a kind of 
anthropogenic cognitive chauvinism reminiscent of Adams’ own - argues that bacteria’s behaviour falls short of 
being driven by full-blow cognition because they fail to entertain propositional attitudes or engage in reasoning. 
Thus, agency is prior to cognition according to him. Weak intentionality, like Walsh’s notion of ecological 
agency, emphasizes behaviour that facilitates an organism’s remaining near homeostatic equilibrium. Unlike 
Walsh, however, I specify cognitively driven behaviour in terms of anticipatory biochemical and sensorimotor 
behaviour; behaviour that is biased in virtue of future-oriented representational content. This is to say that 
Walsh’s account of agency does not - as far as I can tell - distinguish between purely reactive behaviour that is 
driven by homeostatic goals and proactive higher-order homeostatic control. Moreover, weak intentionality, as I 
am arguing here is the mark of the cognitive. That a primitive form of agency may arise in tandem with weak 
intentionality is a contingent feature of the continuum thesis; the correctness of the intentionality continuum 
thesis does not hinge upon the correctness of the claim that a form of agency arises with weak intentionality. 
More generally, whilst Walsh argues for a continuum of ecological agency, I am arguing for a continuum of 
intentionality and hence there is a clear distinction between Walsh’s explanandum and mine. While it is evident 
that he takes a biologically-informed approach to agency, he does not take a biogenic approach to cognition. 
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The temporal distance between A’s occurrence and B’s occurrence will typically determine 
the measure of future-oriented-ness. If B regularly occurs in a matter of seconds after A, then 
future-oriented content will operate at the timescale of seconds. Similarly, if B happens 
minutes after A, then future-oriented content will operate at the timescale of minutes. 
Because weak intentional content drives anticipatory behaviour, the degree of future-
oriented-ness must allow behaviour to occur prior to B and not subsequent to B, the latter 
being a case of mere reflex-like response.  
This correlational rule is implicit in the internal dynamics (i.e., biophysical patterns of 
activity) of a living system and it explains what it is about weak intentional content that 
elicits anticipatory behaviour. Such rules are “learnt” over phylogenetic timescales in virtue 
of the fact that organisms which are or become more responsive to the correlations have more 
selective fitness than those that do not. This results in correlation-sensitive populations. In 
other words, organisms become models of the correlational regularities within their regulated 
environments (Cf. Conant & Ashby, 1970). Over ontogenetic timescales, classical 
conditioning may be one example of how such rules are learnt. Despite the differences in 
timescales at which such rules are learnt, they always bias behaviour that is relative to an 
organism’s homeostatic norms. For example, if environmental state B is beneficial to 
organism’s long-term homeostasis, then that organism’s behaviour will be biased so as to 
prepare it for encountering and interacting with B. If state B is incompatible with an 
organism’s long-term homeostasis, then that organism’s behaviour will be biased so as to 
avoid an encounter with state B. It is in this manner that future-oriented content via 
anticipatory behaviour mandates the temporary alteration of homeostatic equilibrium now in 





Figure 1. future-oriented weak intentional dynamics. The correlational rule (environmental state A will 
be followed by environmental state B) is internalized by an organism such that when A is sensed, future-
oriented dynamics (red oval) are elicited and directed at B as a function of the organism’s homeostasis. 
Anticipatory behaviour, ß, despite its metabolic cost (or other short-term homeostasis destabilizing 
effects), is initiated prior to the coming about of B to ensure long-term homeostasis.  
 
 
Before looking at an example of a system that exhibits future-oriented weak intentional 
dynamics, let us look at a few cases of systems that do not. Doing so will be telling of the fact 
that future-oriented-ness is not itself an overly liberal notion. A moon, when orbiting a planet 
decelerates as it approaches its apoapsis and accelerates afterwards. Why shouldn’t one 
describe this deceleration as a moon’s anticipating its approach to apoapsis and so exhibiting 
future-oriented content?21 Firstly, because behaviour driven by future-oriented-ness is 
grounded in homeostatic norms, and because a moon is not a biotic system, it has no need for 
future-oriented content; abiotic entities do not have homeostatic setpoints to defend. A 
moon’s deceleration can be explained simply in terms of Newtonian mechanistic causes (i.e., 
in terms of gravitational force, mass, and distance between two bodies) given initial 
conditions. Secondly, there is no learning (or adaptation) involved in the moon case, and 
hence, no correlational rules that a moon’s slowing down reflects. To put it differently, a 




21 Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helpfully raising this particular objection and for pushing me to 
respond to it.  
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What then about a simple embodied AI agent (e.g., a robot cell) that can learn environmental 
correlations and use them to anticipate and adaptively behave with respect to temporally 
distant targets? Its behaviour too, given the account above, would fail to exhibit future-
oriented weak intentionality. The reason, again, being that such an agent’s behaviour is not 
relative to homeostatic norms. Weak intentionality cannot be reduced to mere learning-driven 
anticipatory behaviour. There is of course the possibility that an embodied AI might be 
programmed to behaviourally defend a particular setpoint range that is relevant to the 
continued functioning of one or another of is parts (e.g., the cell might be programmed to 
swim away from areas of its environment that are too hot or too cold given its effectors only 
function in a particular temperature range). Whatever the programmed rules by which some 
of the AI’s parts continued functioning occurs are, they are distinct from the kind of 
homeostatic norms that future-oriented dynamics answer to. Not only are homeostatic norms 
intrinsic to biological systems, but they are systemwide; every component part of a biological 
system is subject to metabolic dysfunction given that all such parts are the product of 
metabolisms. Moreover, the functional status of one part is often connected to the continued 
functioning of another. Disrupt the flagellar motor system of an E. Coli, and one also disrupts 
its ability to pursue local nutrients and engage in the metabolic activities that the continued 
functioning of each of its parts are dependent upon. Since long-term dyshomeostasis brings 
about irreversible metabolic disfunction, it is not only the continued functioning of any one 
part (or selection of parts) but the continued functioning of the entire organism that is at stake 
when long-term homeostasis is threatened. In contrast to this, there is often (at least 
currently) a high degree of functional modularity when it comes to embodied AI (Bongard & 
Levin, 2021); the functional disruption of one part of an AI (e.g., its effector system) needn’t 
affect or be affected by the functional stability of any other of its parts.  
 
It is the interdependence of systematic metabolic function and homeostasis that allows 
systems exhibiting weak intentionality to temporarily leverage their current homeostatic 
stability to behave in ways that bring about anticipated effects across multiple connected 
homeostatic norms. As such, future-oriented-ness answers to the long-term stability of 
homeostatic norms across all integrated level of a system’s nested organization. Without 
systemwide homeostatic norms, an AI’s “concern” with a particular functionally relevant 
setpoint (e.g., its local environment’s temperature) is only superficial; it fails to be a goal or a 
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norm for the entire system.22 This is evident by the fact that the AI’s continuing to swim so 
that it maintains a particular temperature is compatible with its “starving to death” (i.e., its 
failing to seek out sources of energy (e.g., chemical, electric, solar, etc.) that would support 
its continued its activity). 
Now, to take an example of a system that does exhibit weak intentional dynamics: after 
detecting decreasing levels of its preferred nutrient (glucose) in its environmental medium, 
some strains of wild yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, begin the metabolically expensive 
process of galactose utilization pathway induction, allowing them to catabolize galactose in 
preparation for eventual glucose depletion (Wang et al., 2015).23 Importantly, S. cerevisiae 
prepare for galactose consumption while still in the presence of glucose and preparation can 
occur up to a striking 3.8 hours before total glucose depletion! One manner of understanding 
this phenomenon is that the internal dynamics that facilitate galactose utilization pathway 
induction are modified in part by the yeast’s sensitivity to a tendency in the global structure 
of its environmental medium. Decreases in glucose concentration are regularly correlated 
with, and hence specify, the eventual exhaustion of glucose. This modification biases the 
system to behave anticipatorily. S. cerevisiae acts not solely with respect to its short-term 
homeostatic maintenance and the sensory/environmental states that it is currently detecting, 
but with respect to the yet-to-be-encountered absence of glucose. The induction of the 
galactose utilization pathway proactively counters the long-term homeostatic instability that 
would occur systematically across all levels of S. cerevisiae’s organization as a result of local 
glucose depletion. The activity of S. cerevisiae’s gene regulatory network exhibits future-
oriented-ness that manifests itself in higher-order homeostatic influence.  
That weak intentional content is future-oriented and allows for anticipatory behaviour at all is 
contingent on the fact that content exhibits some degree of past-oriented-ness. Again, content 
can be future-oriented only insofar as it is the product of learnt environmental correlations 
between a cue and a cued state. Having past-oriented character thus implies the presence of a 
 
22 I suspect that for an embodied AI to have systemwide homeostatic norms and hence to exhibit weak 
intentional dynamics, such agents may very well need to implement something akin to metabolism. Supporting 
this claim, however, must be left as a project of future research.  
23 Wang et al. (2015), write: “We now have shown that low or decreasing levels of a preferred nutrient can serve 
as a predictive cue for eventual depletion. Since this is inevitable when cells deplete a mixture of nutrients at 
unequal rates, and mixed-nutrient environments are ubiquitous in nature, environmental anticipation may be a 
more widespread regulatory strategy than previously recognized” (p.16). 
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simple form of memory that is deployed to guide future behaviour.24 One might at this point 
bulk at the claim that simple organisms such as yeast have a form of memory. However, it 
has been well established that even some bacteria such as E. coli exhibit a simple form 
memory (Macnab & Koshland, 1972; Lambert & Kussell, 2014).25 Furthermore, the idea of 
immune memory in invertebrates has gained recent support (see Milutinovic &́ Kurtz (2016). 
Unlike the memory states that arise as one approaches more complex representational states 
at the strong pole of the continuum, the sole function of memory at the weak end of the 
intentionality continuum is to guide adaptive behaviour in the here and now.  As such, weak 
intentional content exhibiting low degrees of future-oriented-ness cannot be decoupled from 
behaviour.26 
Accuracy conditions at the weak intentionality pole of the continuum coincide with the 
contribution that content makes to an organism successfully adapting to its environment. 
Inaccuracy for S. cerevisiae may be understood as a case in which the induction of the 
galactose pathway occurs due to a small decrease in the sensed glucose concentration despite 
the overall tendency of the environment to be glucose abundant. S. cerevisiae’s weak 
intentional content in such a case diverges from the actual environmental state changes that it 
will encounter and, more importantly, such content results in a maladaptive behavioural 
investment. Accuracy and inaccuracy are respectively manifested in an organism’s continued 
homeostasis or dyshomeostasis and as such can be the basis for learning more complex rules 
of correlation or unlearning those rules that fail to effectively serve homeostatic norms.  
 
With this picture of weak intentionality to hand, I would like to argue that weak intentionality 
is implicated in BA. As we’ve seen above, Lyon takes anticipation to be fundamental to 
cognition. Recall also that BA conceptualizes cognition functionally, in terms of the adaptive 
behavioural capacities underwriting a system’s homeostatic maintenance. As such, cognition 
according to BA is both fundamentally anticipatory and geared towards controlling adaptive 
behaviour. It should be clear by this point how weak intentionality is implied in BA: weak 
 
24 Although simple memory states may not be stored over longer periods of time (this too is a matter of degree) 
the presence of simple forms of memory implies - pace Millikan (1989) - that even simple organisms have some 
capacity to store representations.  
25 For other forms of interesting behaviour-guiding cellular memory in non-neuronal organisms see Burrill & 
Silver (2010). 
26 This behaviour-guaranteeing aspect of weak intentionality along with the fact that it is directed at 
environmental states suggests something very similar to the kind of undifferentiated indicative and imperative 




intentionality describes the future-oriented internal dynamics which underwrite the kind of 






4.2.2 From Weak Intentionality to Strong Intentionality 
 
 
Located on the opposite end of the continuum is the kind of intentionality that Adams 
identifies as a distinctive feature of cognition. Strong intentionality may be characterized as 
the aboutness of mental states rather than the aboutness of behaviour-driving internal 
dynamics of the organism. It is at this level of intentionality that representations with 
conceptual-level content (e.g., beliefs, desires, thought, etc.) arise. Rather than coordinating 
behaviour with environmental states that would be encountered over the course of, say, 
minutes, or hours, mental states provide organisms with a means to anticipate yet-to-be-
encountered environmental states over the course of months and years (e.g., the 
environmental states that accompany seeding the soil in this spring will result in the states 
that accompany a bountiful harvest in autumn and hence avoiding hunger in winter).  
 
At this pole of the continuum, anticipatory behaviour is no longer dependent upon an 
organism’s learning correlations between exact environment state relata types. Moving from 
weak intentionality to strong intentionality, correlation rules become generalizable. Because 
environmental state type A´ is similar to type A, content will be directed towards B 
subsequent to encountering state types A or A´. Importantly, this generalization is not merely 
due to the fact that sensory systems may respond similarly to stimuli that are alike; rather, it 
occurs in virtue of the fact that agents have access to their mental states and may compare 
like properties of perceived objects/events. Such access allows complex organisms to both 
metacognitively evaluate new beliefs against their other held beliefs and opens up the 
possibility of choosing the most appropriate behaviour that is consistent with one’s set of 
held beliefs or desires. Such access means that content at the end of strong intentionality 
becomes more reliant upon learning at faster, ontogenetic timescales, allowing for living 




Moreover, content at the level of strong intentionality may be generated offline; it (at least in 
principle) may be fully insensitive to the influences of currently impinging environmental 
stimuli. As such strong intentional content may serve to both control and select a range of 
future actions in virtue of representing action outcomes over longer timescales. As organism 
and their environments complexify, rather than it being the case that encounters with A type 
states lead to content’s being directed towards B type states, organisms can self-generate 
hypothetical B states that are desired (i.e., self-imposed goals) and work backwards towards 
the kinds of A-involving behaviours which would bring B about. This naturally places those 
living systems that have evolutionarily developed the capacity to engender future-oriented 
mental states in the advantageous position of using aboutness to engage in counterfactual 
reasoning (e.g., were I to rent a flat nearer to the university campus, I would spend less time 
in transit next term). 
 
Another distinctive feature of aboutness at the level of strong intentionality is the fact that its 
effects upon maintaining homeostasis occurs at longer timescales; as intentional content 
increases in strength, not only does content’s time horizon increase, but both content and 
content-driven behaviour can become further removed from needing to directly answer to an 
organism’s homeostatic norms. Having the belief that “black widows are poisonous” whilst 
living in Edinburgh is valuable to one’s adaptive behaviour even when such spiders are not 
native to the UK. For having such a belief could make the difference between careful and 
careless behaviour were one to encounter (and recognize) a black widow when visiting Los 
Angeles next year. At the far end of the continuum, complex animals such as ourselves may 
plan to bring out preferred states of affairs that very well may temporally fall beyond our own 
lifespans. For example, we are able to systematically formulate thoughts as to how interaction 
between humans and artificial intelligent agents should look in the best future case – a vision 
that corresponds to certain ethical, economic, and scientific values. We can engage in such 
systematic thought despite the fact that the development of such artificially intelligent agents 
may be well beyond our lifetimes. It is because the aboutness of mental states may operate 
over increasingly longer timescales in the future (more future-oriented-ness) that complex 
organisms such as ourselves to have the capacity to plan and bring about the shape of distant 
events despite the fact that such events may have no direct affect upon our own homeostatic 




It is important to stress that although all content across the continuum of intentionality is 
future-oriented, it is only at the level of strong intentionality that content may come apart 
from causally bringing about behaviour; it is not behaviour-guaranteeing. Similarly, strong 
intentional content may be relevant to a range of different behaviours across varying 
timescales despite an agent never having to initiate any one of those behaviours (see Sterelny, 
2003 for a similar emphasis upon the relationship between what I am calling strong 
intentionality and content relevant to a range of behaviour).  
 
I would like to suggest that since weak and strong intentionality are located at opposite ends 
of a continuum, there is no sharp cut-off between them.27 Strong intentionality may be seen 
as grounded in the same anticipation-driven, self-preserving processes that underwrite weak 
intentionality. To use a phrase coined by Godfrey-Smith (1996), that weak intentionality 
“shades off into” strong intentionality does not imply that the former does not play a role in 
underwriting the latter. On the contrary, without the kind of weak intentionality that drives 
adaptive behaviour at shorter timescales, it would seem that strong intentionality could not 
arise. Consistent with BA’s evolutionary assumption that ‘higher’ cognition has evolved from 
simpler cognitive capacities, strong intentionality may be seen as an evolutionary 
achievement. I suggest that BA should construe strong intentionality as a variable trait that 
was built upon a foundation of weak intentionality and selected for because it allowed 
complex organisms to respond to selective pressures across progressively longer timescales 
and environments with more behavioural complexity. The daily behaviour of complex 
organisms is a continuous shifting between higher and lesser degrees of strong intentionality, 
but weak intentional states always subtend even the most complex behaviour.  
 
One may reasonably speculate that the arrival of strong intentionality and the biological 
hardware underpinning it on the biological scene was closely linked to the fact that meeting 
selective pressures placed new requirements on organisms as they began to inhabit 
environments with more complexity (or their niches grew in complexity) (Godfrey-Smith, 
1996). One such requirement may have been being able to understand causal relationships 
without requiring that the agent itself be the cause. Intentional content that could be generated 
and monitored without entailing any behaviour at all, by allowing an agent to influence long-
 
27 That this is the case does not imply that there is not a distinction to be had between non-conceptual content 
and conceptual content. Conceptual content may be of a format that is a more recent evolutionary development, 
but as an expression of strong intentionality it is based upon the same weak intentionality that non-conceptual 
content is. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify this point.  
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timescale dynamics and efficiently influence and predict other agents’ behaviour made 
complex environments less hostile. The conditions underpinning the transition from lesser to 
increased environmental-organismal complexity might very well be a matter of what Sterelny 
(2003) describes as move from inhabiting “informationally transparent environments” (i.e., 
environments in which there are one-to-one mappings between sensory cues and 
environmental resources) to inhabiting “informationally translucent environments” (i.e., 
environments in which there are many-to-one or one-to-many mappings of sensory cues to 
resources).28  
 
Strong intentionality and the conceptual representations that often accompany it, as I am 
envisioning them, allow organisms to exert influence upon the protracted and often 
informationally ambiguous environmental dynamics that are specific to complex 
environments. They allow such organisms to utilize control states (i.e., conceptual-level 
representations) that become further and further removed from influencing (and the influence 
of) current environmental states. On the other hand, when simpler organisms are able to meet 
the selection pressures in their lesser complex environments, using conceptual representations 
that are suited to long-timescale environmental dynamics to guide behaviour in the here and 
now falls short of being an adaptive strategy. For too much organismal complexity (relative 
to the level of environmental complexity that ‘satisfices’ for self-preservation) renders an 
organism’s responses inefficient, slow, and often detrimental to its survival. Although this 
may be the case, a continuum of intentionality helps to illustrate how responding to shorter 
timescale dynamics and less complexity nonetheless involves behaviour that is driven by 
weak intentionality. 
 
We can therefore agree with Adams that conceptual representations are distinct from sensory 
representation while rejecting that only conceptual representations demarcate the domain of 
the cognitive. As one moves from weak to strong intentionality, the content and the kinds of 
representations change from having content that is directed at target yet-to-be-encountered 
objects/gradients causally underpinning sensorimotor behaviour to having content that can be 
directed at one’s own mental states (e.g., a belief about one’s own belief – that it is false). As 
one moves along the continuum from weak to strong intentionality, there is also a move from 
 
28 Importantly, Sterelny suggests that the increased complexity of informationally translucent environments is 
partly due to presence of hostile agents (i.e., prey, predators, and competitors) which pollute environmental 
information for a given agent via the subversion of that agent’s efforts or concealment. This induces the 
possibility of false negatives, making the obtaining of resources expensive. 
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representations that are behaviour entailing and influenced (but not fully) by impinging 
sensory stimuli to representations that are behaviour contingent and possibly stimulus 
insensitive (i.e., content being immune to the influenced the impinging sensory stimuli). As 
the continuum approaches stimulus insensitive representation, agents acquire the capacity to 
shift from behaviourally exploiting their environment to exploring their environment with no 






29 A further manner of understanding this transition across the continuum (at least along part of the continuum) 
is as a passage from content that is about changes in meaningful gradient intensity to content that is about the 
sources of the gradients (i.e., objects). This is a passage from what has been called “minimal perception” to 






Figure 2. A continuum of intentionality: above are some of the various research programmes which 
might be seen to investigate forms of cognitive phenomena associated with a particular degree of 
intentionality; below are some of the primary attributes of representational content as they are located at 
various places upon the continuum and capacities associated with them. When going from the weak end to 
the strong end of the continuum there is an increase in future-oriented-ness or how far into the future 




4.3 Overly Permissive or Not?  
 
The initial worry which set the stage for Adams’ classification methodology and its upshot, 
the argument from intentionality, was that BA is overly permissive. Now given what has 
been said regarding the intentionality continuum, is there any reason for thinking that this 
worry has been defanged? I would like to suggest that the actual worry behind the claim that 
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BA is overly permissive is this: accepting BA means that everything which an organism does 
now turns out to be cognition. I think this worry would be a real one if all biological 
processes were underwritten by weak intentionality. Recall however that weak intentionality 
regulates homeostatic mechanisms but is not itself homeostasis; there is intentionality 
simpliciter only from allostasis up. This being the case means that there is a range of 
ubiquitous biological processes (homeostatic control processes) which, when not subsumed 
under weak intentional dynamics, fail to rise to the status of cognitive processes. The 
possibility that all organisms engage in some behaviour that is driven by weak intentional 
dynamics does not imply that every behaviour of all organisms is so driven. As such, BA 
when buttressed by the intentionality continuum does not result in making every biological 
process cognitive.  
Moreover, even if all organisms engage in some kind of cognitively driven behaviour (which 
very well might be the case if the continuum thesis is correct), this needn’t be seen as 
evidence for a theory’s being explanatorily barren. This might indeed be the case if, as a 
result of cognition being a ubiquitous feature of living systems, all accounts of cognition 
ended up being somehow indistinguishable (e.g., explaining cognition in bacteria turned out 
to be no different than explaining cognition in bonobos). If the intentionality continuum 
thesis is on track, however, it provides BA theorists with not only a conceptual manner of 
distinguishing different forms of cognition but a way of recognizing that phenomena located 
across the continuum are in fact in need of different explanations. Importantly, the continuum 
thesis suggests a way in which these explanations, although distinct, are nonetheless related 





From the perspective of BA, a complete investigation of cognition does not involve 
relinquishing AA full stop, but rather rejecting the notion that all forms of cognition must 
satisfy human-based demarcation criteria. If what I have argued in this paper is correct, weak 
intentionality may serve as a common feature of cognition for both BA and AA; a feature that 
in ensuring that both approaches are not talking past one another, allows for the possibility of 
a complete investigation of cognition in its various expressions and degrees of complexity.  
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Far from being harmful to cognitive scientific enquiry, as Adams suggests, BA offers a 
valuable peek inside the possible evolution of biological cognition, shedding light on its 
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